Commentary : central bank communication and policy effectiveness by Tiff Macklem
Introduction
I am honored to have been included in this celebration of the
Greenspan era. The subject of this session—monetary policy commu-
nications—is particularly relevant, since one of the most significant
developments of the Greenspan era has been the evolution toward
greater transparency and greater attention to communications as an
integral part of U.S. monetary policy. As we debate whether central
banks should publish their forecasts of future policy rates, it is easy to
forget that it was only 11 years ago, in 1994, under Chairman
Greenspan’s leadership, that the Fed began publicly disclosing its
current policy actions. Indeed, Chairman Greenspan has transformed
the Federal Reserve into an institution that embraces the benefits of
transparency. At a more individual level, he also has set the standard
of excellence for public speeches. His gift is the ability to articulate
deep insight on the economic issues of our time in a way that is both
clear and accessible, yet recognizes the limits of our knowledge.
I also am very pleased to be discussing this paper by professor
Woodford. It provides a comprehensive and analytic tour of the liter-
ature and practice of central banking. In doing so, it tackles head-on
the key communication issues monetary policy makers are grappling
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475with. And it delivers the clarity of thought and compelling logic that
we have come to expect from his work.
My comments proceed in three parts. I begin by summarizing what I
perceive as the essence of professor Woodford’s analysis. Next, I comment
on the empirical evidence regarding the value of transparency and
communications. Finally, I offer some personal views on the kinds of
information that are most important for central banks to communicate.
Woodford in summary: If monetary policy was like driving
a car…
To decide what central banks should communicate, it is important
to understand, first, why transparency is beneficial and, second, what
communication requirements this imposes. A particular strength of
professor Woodford’s analysis is that he is very clear on both points.
So, before commenting on his paper, let me try and summarize the
essence of his analysis using a well-worn metaphor.
Monetary policy often has been compared to driving a car. The
central bank must control the economy by using the accelerator and
the brake—interest rates—to maintain a safe speed. Effective driving,
like effective monetary policy, requires the driver to be forward-
looking and to anticipate the ups and downs and bends in the road
ahead. Failure to do so can lead to a crash or, at least, a sharp slowing.
There are, of course, some critical differences between setting mone-
tary policy and driving a car, and Woodford reminds us of an
important one: the role of expectations. The car’s performance does
not depend on its own expectations about where it is heading. But
suppose it did. This, Woodford points out, creates the almost magical
opportunity for a better ride. 
Woodford explains that transparency can make monetary policy
more effective in two ways. First, better information about the central
bank’s actions and intentions increases the degree to which central
bank decisions about the policy interest rate can affect expectations of
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 future interest rates and, hence, other asset prices, and ultimately,
spending decisions and inflation. This is like better-gripping tires that
provide better, more consistent traction. Second, transparency
provides a mechanism to resolve the time-inconsistency problem, and
in doing so, it helps to anchor long-run inflation expectations. This is
a like a better suspension that keeps the car more stable. It is as if
telling your car that you are going to be a good driver and describing
how you will do this improves your traction and upgrades your
suspension. As a result, you consistently can achieve better travel
times—low and stable inflation—while also enjoying a smoother
ride—less variability in output. Moreover, both these objectives can be
achieved with less fuel—lower volatility in the policy interest rate. But
there is a catch. The driver has to follow through on her plan.
Although she can make allowances for changes in road conditions, if
she indicated she would do so when she described how she was going
to drive, she cannot change her behavior and suddenly decide to slow
down and take in the scenery or stop for a coffee.
So far, there is no need for ongoing communication. Sticking with
the car metaphor, the driver simply needs to describe upfront what she
plans to do in every conceivable driving situation—her complete state-
contingent rule—and then follow it. But Woodford offers three reasons
why, in practice, transparency requires ongoing communication. First,
the complete state-contingent rule is likely to be too complex to be
described in detail in a one-time statement.1 But if the bank regularly
communicates its analysis and the reasons for its policy decisions, the
private sector will be better able to predict how the central bank will
react in a wide range of situations. Second, communicating its inten-
tions is likely to help the central bank remember them and remain
focused on them—that is, avoid being distracted by a desire to enjoy
the scenery or pursue other objectives. Third, communication is impor-
tant for verifiability. Because there are considerable lags between
changes in the policy rate and the effects on spending and inflation,
verifying that the central bank is indeed making good-faith efforts to
achieve its stated objectives requires communication about the central
bank’s analysis and the rationale for policy decisions.2
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 Once you accept the argument that monetary policy can be more
effective through transparent communication of the analysis and the
rationale for its decisions, the logic eloquently laid out by Woodford
leads inexorably to the conclusion that the central bank should
communicate its complete outlook, including the outlook for future
policy interest rates. Given that monetary policy needs to be forward-
looking, the central bank’s analysis and decisions must embody a view
of the future. So, communicating its analysis and the rationale for its
decisions involves describing its view of the future: its outlook. And
clearly, for its outlook to be understood and evaluated, the central
bank must reveal the policy path that this outlook is conditioned on.
Can there be any other conclusion? Considering this question
suggests another: What is the empirical evidence that better communi-
cation actually improves the effectiveness of monetary policy? 
Does the quality of communication really matter?
Whether or not good communication matters is ultimately an
empirical question. The challenge is to identify the independent bene-
fits of better communication from the benefits of better monetary
policy narrowly defined (by which I mean simply the skillful use of the
accelerator and brake to achieve objectives). The complicating factor is
the clear interdependence of the two. Good communication may
enhance good policy, but it is unlikely to compensate for poor policy.
There would seem to be two possible approaches to identification.
The first is to examine the experience of a country where the imple-
mentation of better policy narrowly defined preceded significant
improvements in communication. Here, I will draw on the Cana-
dian experience and examine whether the more transparent
implementation and communication of monetary policy increased
the degree to which policy decisions affected expectations about
future interest rates. Does better communication improve traction? 
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 The second approach to identification is to use cross-country varia-
tion. While central banks around the world have converged on price
stability as the appropriate goal of monetary policy and have moved
toward increased transparency, differences remain in the types and the
specificity of the information provided. Perhaps the most obvious
difference, and one that has received considerable attention, is that
some countries, such as Canada and the United Kingdom, have
adopted an explicit inflation target, while others, such as the United
States, have made a clear commitment to low inflation without attach-
ing a specific numerical value to the objective. Here, I will review the
cross-country evidence on whether announcing a numerical objective
is helpful in anchoring expectations about future inflation. Does
communicating a numerical target provide better suspension?
Better traction? Some Canadian evidence
In Canada, improvements in monetary policy in the form of greater
clarity about objectives preceded significant improvements in the
transparent implementation and communication of monetary policy.
This provides the opportunity to separately identify the impact of
transparency and improved communication in the implementation
of monetary policy.
In his 1988 Hanson Lecture, Gov. John Crow established price stabil-
ity as the goal of monetary policy in Canada, and in February 1991, the
Bank of Canada and the Government of Canada announced jointly
agreed-upon inflation control targets. The initial targets called for a
gradual reduction in inflation to the 2 percent midpoint of a 1 to 3
percent inflation control range by the end of 1995, and, since then, the
target and control range have remained unchanged.3
Despite the transparency of the 1991 announcement, other key
aspects of the implementation and communication of monetary
policy remained less than transparent in the first years with the 
inflation target. In the early 1990s in Canada (as in the United
States), decisions on the policy interest rate were not even disclosed,
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 let alone explained; adjustments were not in fixed increments (for
example, changes of 25 basis points); and changes in the policy rate
were achieved through a variety of interventions in the market for
short-term liquidity that made them difficult to identify. Moreover,
in Canada, policy decisions were not taken at fixed meeting dates,
and Bank commentary on the Canadian economy and on monetary
policy was limited.
Since then, the Bank of Canada, like many other central banks, has
gradually moved toward greater transparency in policy implementation
and communication (see Jenkins, 2001; Freedman, 2002). Starting in
the mid-1990s, there were a number of changes that made the setting
of the policy interest rate increasingly transparent. An operating band
was introduced for the overnight interest rate (1994); the Bank began
to issue a press release whenever there was a change in the band (1996);
the target overnight rate (the analog to the target fed funds rate) was set
as the midpoint of the band (1999); and the Bank moved to a system
of eight pre-announced policy decision dates (2000), consistent with
the practice of fixed decision dates in most major countries. Also start-
ing in the mid-1990s, a number of initiatives were undertaken to
enhance the understanding and communication of monetary policy.
The centerpiece was the semi-annual Monetary Policy Report, intro-
duced in 1995, which was subsequently augmented with semi-annual
Updates, beginning in 2000.4 While each of these steps was small, put
together they added up to a sea of change in transparency from the
mid-1990s through to the introduction of fixed decision dates in the
autumn of 2000. And, interestingly, the experience provides remark-
ably clear empirical evidence that communication really matters.
Using daily interest rate data from 1995 to 1999, Gravelle and
Moessner (2002) examine the reaction of the yield curves in Canada
and the United States to macroeconomic announcements in both
countries, as well as to changes in the policy rates of both countries.
Consistent with previous studies, they found that many U.S. macro-
economic announcements have significant effects on U.S. bond yields.
In sharp contrast, Canadian bond yields showed almost no reaction to
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 Canadian macroeconomic news but were significantly affected by U.S.
news. This suggests that financial market participants had a poor
understanding of the Bank of Canada’s reaction function (which natu-
rally focused ultimately on domestic conditions). In addition, Gravelle
and Moessner found that the Canadian yield curve reacted much more
strongly to Canadian policy decisions than did the U.S. curve to
changes in the fed funds rate. This suggests that the views of financial
markets and the Federal Reserve were more closely aligned than those
of financial markets and the Bank of Canada. Evidently, the
predictability of monetary policy in Canada in the second half of the
1990s had not achieved the standard of the Greenspan era in the
United States.
In a follow-up study, Parent (2002) updates the analysis of Gravelle
and Moessner for the two-year period starting in late 2000 and coin-
ciding with the move to fixed decision dates for monetary policy. The
move to fixed dates is particularly noteworthy since it integrated
many of the improvements made over the previous five years into a
more systematic and coherent communications strategy (see Parent,
Munro, and Parker, 2003). Parent’s results suggest a marked change
in market behavior. Over the 2000-2002 sample, Canadian interest
rates were significantly affected by Canadian macroeconomic news,
the sensitivity to U.S. news declined, and the impact of changes in
the policy rate on the yield curve was much smaller. 
Similar results have been obtained in separate studies by Johnson
(2003) and Andreou (2005). Johnson examines the ability of short-
term asset yields to predict changes in the policy interest rate. He
finds that in samples ending prior to the move to fixed policy dates,
short-term yields have little predictive power for the policy rate,
suggesting that financial markets were often surprised by policy
actions. But following the introduction of fixed dates, the predictive
content of short-term yields improves significantly. Andreou (2005)
looks at the effects of “surprise” policy actions across the entire 
Canadian yield curve and finds that the impact on longer-term 
interest rates of a surprise action by the Bank has diminished since the
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 introduction of fixed policy dates. This suggests that policy actions
signal only the timing of interest rate changes necessary to achieve the
inflation target and do not signal changes in the longer-term policy
goal. The clear conclusion is that the accumulation of improvements
in transparency and communication up to 2000 significantly
improved the ability of the Bank of Canada to influence future inter-
est rates consistent with its intentions and, hence, to gain traction.
Better suspension? Some cross-country evidence
Gaining traction is helpful, but potentially much larger benefits can
be achieved if improved communication can better anchor long-run
inflation expectations—in other words, provide better suspension. A
key communication question in this regard is whether there is an
additional benefit to a numerical inflation target beyond the clear
benefits of pursuing a low-inflation policy. 
Many studies have examined this question. It is fair to say that the
majority have found few statistically significant benefits of an explicit
inflation target, either in terms of the output costs of disinflation
(Debelle, 1997; Bernanke, Laubach, Mishkin, and Posen, 1999);
short-run inflation expectations (Johnson, 2002, 2003); inflation,
output, and interest rate volatilities (Norman and von Hagen, 2002);
or the inflationary consequences of supply shocks or the sensitivity of
expectations to realized inflation (Ball and Sheridan, 2003). At the
same time, there is some newer evidence that a numerical inflation
objective in fact may be helpful in anchoring medium- to long-run
inflation expectations. 
First, there is some evidence that a numerical inflation target reduces
the persistence of inflation by weakening the link between realized and
expected inflation. In particular, several studies have found that inflation
persistence has fallen in some countries with an explicit inflation 
objective (for example, Siklos, 1999, and Kuttner and Posen, 2001). But
more significantly, in a very interesting recent paper, Levin, Natalucci,
and Piger (2004) find that past inflation has had less impact on long-run
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 expectations for inflation in countries with an explicit inflation objec-
tive. In particular, they find that, in a sample of seven industrialized
countries without an explicit inflation objective, the consensus private-
sector inflation forecasts at all horizons are significantly correlated with
a three-year moving average of lagged inflation. In contrast, the compa-
rable correlations for a sample of five inflation-targeting countries are
similar at short horizons but virtually absent at long horizons, suggest-
ing that an explicit inflation target eliminates the link between realized
inflation and long-run inflation expectations. Consistent with these
results, they also find significant evidence that inflation is less persistent
in inflation-targeting countries compared with non-targeters. 
Second, there is also some evidence from financial markets that a
numerical target may be helpful in anchoring long-run inflation expec-
tations. This is suggested by the observation that realized volatilities of
the yields on longer-term government bonds have declined considerably
more in a sample of inflation-targeting countries relative to the United
States. As shown in Charts 1 and 2, realized volatilities in four inflation
targeters—New Zealand, Canada, the United Kingdom, and Sweden—
were typically above those in the United States, but by the end of the
1990s, they had converged to U.S. levels. Since then, volatility has
increased more in the United States than in the inflation targeters, so
volatility actually has been lower in the targeting countries. While there
are certainly other interpretations, this is at least consistent with the view
that inflation expectations are becoming better anchored in inflation-
targeting regimes relative to the United States. Indeed, just the fact that
the inflation targeters would achieve volatilities as low as those in the
United States is impressive, given that the U.S. economy is larger and
more closed, and that the U.S. bond market is the biggest and deepest
in the world.
While all this evidence is by no means definitive, the clear implica-
tion is that communication matters. This leads to another question. 
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Chart 1
Monthly Standard Deviation of Daily 10-Year Benchmark
Bond Yields
Chart 2












































































































Source: BIS and author’s calculation
Lines are smoothed using a 12-month moving average.
Source: BIS and author’s calculation
Lines are smoothed using a 12-month moving average.
 What is most important to communicate?
Following on the theoretical reasons why effective communication
can increase the effectiveness of monetary policy, Woodford articulates
a clear view of what information a central bank should communicate.
This includes its current policy decisions and the reasons for the deci-
sion, its assessment of economic conditions and its economic outlook,
the general strategy that guides the central bank’s decisions, and its
outlook for future policy interest rates. I largely agree. Moreover, I
agree with Woodford that models for policy advice should include a
reaction function or policy rule for interest rates that is consistent with
achieving the central bank’s objectives. Projections based on policy
rules that do not achieve the central bank’s objectives are less useful for
internal deliberations and, hence, probably less useful for external
agents too.
From objectives to instruments—the “natural order”
In an effort to provide some value added and perhaps highlight
where views may differ the most, let me offer my perspective on where
a central bank should place the greatest emphasis in its communica-
tions and provide the most specific information. By extension, I also
will comment on where a central bank should be more cautious. 
There is a natural order to communicating monetary policy, and
it roughly follows the order on Woodford’s list. To put it in my
own words, this order starts with objectives, then moves to the
general strategy used to achieve those objectives, the central bank’s
assessment of how well it is achieving them, its outlook for the
variables for which it has objectives, and finally its outlook for its
policy instrument. 
My suggestion is that the degree of emphasis and detail in communica-
tion should follow this same natural order.Thus, for a central bank with
the objective of price stability, considerable emphasis should be
placed on the inflation objective, and an explicit target should be
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 provided to make this commitment clearer and more concrete. At the
next level down, the central bank should explain its assessment of
inflationary pressures, including its view of the output gap and its
outlook for future inflation. Finally, at the bottom of the natural
order is the outlook for future policy rates. The implication is that
this should receive relatively less emphasis and that the information
provided should be less detailed. Thus, it may be helpful for the
central bank to make broad statements about the implications of its
economic outlook for monetary policy going forward. But it will not
be helpful to publish its forecast for future policy rates, as has been
advocated by Lars Svensson (2005), or to fine-tune expectations for
future policy rates, as Woodford suggests.
Good communication should enhance the public’s and the market’s
understanding of the objectives and the behavior of the central bank,
while encouraging feedback from markets on the consistency of the
central bank’s objectives and its expected behavior. As a guide to
communication priorities, the “natural order” is designed to support
the goal of good communication. It does this in several ways.
Puts the focus appropriately on the medium to long run
Of the two reasons Woodford offers for how communication can
enhance the effectiveness of monetary policy, I would argue that the
more important one is the anchoring of medium- to long-run infla-
tion expectations. Centering communication on the inflation target
provides the appropriate medium- to long-run focus for monetary
policy and continually reinforces the commitment to this objective.
This helps to anchor inflation expectations, which are the key
element in shaping the behavior of economic agents consistent with
the ultimate objective of good economic performance.
Minimizes confusion between objectives and instruments
As Woodford suggests, communicating the outlook for policy inter-
est rates may increase the central bank’s influence over expectations of
future interest rates and asset prices more broadly. There is a risk,
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 however, that communicating this type of information may cause
confusion that will erode the central bank’s credibility for low infla-
tion. In particular, the risk is that forecasts of the policy rate get
confused for objectives rather than instruments, and in this way,
erode confidence that the central bank is staying focused on the
objective of price stability.5 This risk also applies to other asset prices
in the central bank’s outlook, such as the exchange rate, housing
prices, and equity values. In very open economies, the risk is particu-
larly acute for the exchange rate, precisely because central banks have,
at times, become distracted by exchange rate fluctuations. Indeed, a
key message for the central bank to deliver is that it does not have a
target for the exchange rate; rather, the flexible exchange rate is an
integral part of the monetary framework, which affords monetary
policy the ability to focus on domestic objectives.
Better two-way communication with financial markets
Uncertainty is much more pervasive than suggested by the additive
shocks included in the models considered by Woodford and used for
policy analysis and economic projections. In practice, monetary policy
makers face a range of uncertainties, including data uncertainty, uncer-
tainty about shock persistence, parameter uncertainty, and model
uncertainty (Longworth and Jenkins, 2002). Coping with uncertainty
is, therefore, integral to monetary policy formulation. Part of the strat-
egy for coping with this uncertainty is to draw on a wide variety of
information sources in coming to decisions, and financial markets are
an important source of information.6 In particular, financial markets
aggregate a wide range of diverse judgments to produce a market-equi-
librium view of the future path of policy rates. Provided that the
objectives of the central bank are both clear and credible, this view
furnishes an independent assessment of the policy path that will be
consistent with achieving the central bank’s objective.
The risk is that by publishing its interest rate forecast, the central
bank may reduce the quality of the information provided by financial
markets. This will be the case if, as argued by Morris and Shin (2002),
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 private agents overweight the information provided by the central
bank. As Woodford points out, Svensson’s (2005) analysis of the
Morris and Shin model demonstrates that their “overweighting”
result holds only when the central bank has considerably better fore-
casts than the public. In the case of the central bank’s forecast for
output or inflation, this seems unlikely to be the case, and, hence, the
risk that publishing this information will reduce the quality of the
information provided by the market appears small. But future policy
rates is the one area where the central bank is likely to at least be
perceived to have a clear informational advantage, and, hence, the
risk is more serious in this case. This suggests that in setting its
communication priorities, the central bank should put more empha-
sis on its inflation target and the inflation forecast, and less on its
intentions for future policy rates.
Balancing conditionality and commitment
The natural order aligns communications priorities roughly from
the least to the most conditional. The inflation target is almost
unconditional, whereas the interest rate forecast is highly conditional
because the policy rate is the instrument that must be adjusted to
keep inflation on target as new information becomes available. By
placing more emphasis on less-conditional information, the natural
order minimizes the risks associated with communicating more-
conditional information.
Effectively communicating the degree of conditionality of the fore-
cast for future policy rates is likely to be difficult. For the policy rate
forecast to have any influence on expectations of future policy rates,
agents must perceive that there is some degree of commitment to
follow this path. But given that it is conditional, it will change when
conditions change, and since conditions almost certainly will change,
the original conditional path is unlikely to be fully realized. Aligning
beliefs between the market and the central bank as to exactly what the
nature of the commitment is, and when it is appropriate to abandon
the commitment in light of new information, is a communication
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 assignment that is bound to experience missteps. The risk is that these
missteps may erode the credibility of the central bank and, in doing
so, do more harm than good.
Communication near the zero lower bound
To further illustrate the natural order, it is useful to consider its
implications for the communication of monetary policy near the zero
interest rate bound. Woodford discusses in some detail the experience
of the Federal Reserve with a near-lower-bound policy rate in the
spring and summer of 2003. In particular, he interprets the “consid-
erable period” language used by the FOMC as a practical way to
implement what he calls a history-dependent policy or what I would
call an element of price-level targeting. Faced with a lower-bound
constraint, the Fed wanted to raise expected inflation and lower
expected real interest rates further out the yield curve by more than
was implied by past behavior. To do this, it used the “considerable
period” language to signal its conditional intention “to keep policy
accommodative for a longer period than had been the practice in past
periods of accelerating economic activity.” Woodford suggests that
the Fed’s successful management of this difficult period speaks to the
benefits of effective communication.7 But how would the communi-
cation have looked using the natural order as the guide?
With an explicit inflation target, the Fed could have announced
that it was raising its inflation target from x percent to y percent for
the next t years to reverse the price-level implications of inflation
having been below desired levels. Financial markets would have
immediately inferred that this implied that future policy rates would
be lower than they would have been otherwise, and yields out the
curve would have adjusted to reflect this without the need for specific
guidance on future policy rates. Moreover, going forward, as realized
inflation approached the new target, financial markets would be able
to observe that the central bank’s objective was being achieved and
would have updated their views about future policy rates accordingly.
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 This approach might have offered some advantages. Since the new
inflation target is much less conditional than the policy path required
to hit the target, it would be easier to align the central bank’s and the
market’s understanding of the nature of the commitment. A second,
closely related advantage is that communication in terms of the infla-
tion target may have facilitated verifiability. Financial markets, as well
as the public, can observe when inflation is approaching the new target.
In contrast, it is more difficult to observe whether the central bank is
respecting its conditional intentions to keep policy rates low for a
“considerable period.” A third, albeit more tentative, advantage is that
announcing the higher inflation target for t periods may have been
more effective in raising expected inflation over this horizon. If
announcing an explicit target is helpful in influencing inflation expec-
tations, as suggested by some of the empirical evidence reviewed earlier,
making the new inflation objective more explicit would enhance the
effectiveness of the policy, both by increasing the traction of monetary
policy on real interest rates across the yield curve and by anchoring
inflation expectations more firmly on the new inflation target.
Final remarks
To summarize, transparency and communication offer an almost
magical opportunity for monetary policy. If monetary policy were like
driving a car, it is as if by telling your car upfront how you are going to
behave, you somehow increase your traction on the road and improve
your suspension. The emphasis in the Greenspan era on communication
as an integral part of monetary policy has achieved a much smoother
ride for the United States and, indeed, for the global economy.
The “natural order” provides a guide to communications priorities
that is designed to enhance the effectiveness of monetary policy.
Determining how far down this priority ordering central banks should
go is a question of assessing the point along the continuum that can
make the greatest contribution to the effectiveness of monetary policy.
As we continue to gain experience and to debate these issues, our
assessment of where this point is will no doubt continue to evolve.
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 Professor Woodford’s enormously insightful paper has made an impor-
tant contribution to our understanding and assessment of the role of
communications, and to the continued evolution of the practice of
central banking.
________________
Author’s note: The author is grateful to Pascal Bédard for research assistance. These comments
benefited from helpful discussions with Don Coletti, Paul Jenkins, Grahame Johnson, Mari-
anne Johnson, Bruce Little, John Murray, Larry Schembri, and Ianthi Vayid. The views
expressed are the author’s and do not necessarily represent those of the Bank of Canada.
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 Endnotes
1I would add that such a rule is probably too much for a central bank to work
out any time soon, much less communicate.
2As an aside, I would add a fourth reason, which, though related to verifiability, is
broader: accountability. As Woodford notes in passing, democratic principles demand
accountability, and there is a close link between transparency, communication, and
accountability. Hence, in democratic societies, transparent communication has a direct
benefit that is independent of the effectiveness of monetary policy. However, I would
add that democratic legitimacy itself may enhance the effectiveness of monetary policy
by reinforcing the view that the policy objectives of the central bank will be sustained
over the long term.
3The target was defined in terms of a specific measure of inflation, the 12-month
rate of change in the consumer price index (CPI), and the Bank was explicit that it
would use a publicly announced measure of core CPI inflation as an operational
guide to achieving the target for total CPI inflation.
4In these documents, the Governing Council (the monetary policy decision
committee) outlines its interpretation of economic developments, its assessment of
the outlook for inflation and economic activity, the key risks to this outlook, and
the implications for monetary policy. The forward-looking information included in
this document has expanded over time and currently includes the current output
gap, two-year-ahead forecasts for output growth, potential output, core CPI infla-
tion, and total CPI inflation. While there is often a general assessment of the
implications for monetary policy going forward, an explicit forecast of future policy
rates is not provided.
5Mishkin (2004) raises similar concerns in a broader context and counsels central
banks to follow the KISS (Keep It Simple Stupid) principle.
6See Macklem (2002) for a description of the information and analysis that is consid-
ered during the monetary policy decisionmaking process at the Bank of Canada.
7As Woodford points out, the use of a history-dependent policy rule makes effec-
tive communication particularly critical because this policy outperforms a constant
inflation target only if it is both understood and believed by the public. For an early
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